The Bad Economics of Bullying: Rethinking Foreign-Policy Strategies
U.S. President Donald Trump has employed a bullying approach in foreign policy, threatening various nations with punitive measures like tariffs to secure specific objectives such as enhancing market access and managing immigration. Yet, the effectiveness of this bullying strategy remains questionable—can it yield lasting success in diplomacy? Understanding the economic implications of bullying is essential.
While bullies often act from distorted psychological drives, for their actions to be strategic, they must be targeted to alter behaviours that benefit the bully’s goals. For instance, the imposition of tariffs could serve both revenue generation and protection of domestic sectors. Observations suggest that threats, like those made against Colombia leading to its acceptance of returned nationals, might yield diplomatic successes.
Trump’s threats encompass conditional military support for nations facing invasion, showcasing a strategic use to compel allies, as demonstrated in NATO. While he may achieve short-term results through intimidation, the core question remains—can bullying sustain efficacy as a diplomatic tool?
Like any tactic, bullying involves distinct costs and benefits. The ideal threat for a bully is one that compels compliance without necessitating action, yet actualising threats can incur significant costs. A credible bully must be prepared to face these costs if they need to follow through, balancing the perceived net losses against the intended gains.
Trump’s reliance on tariffs illustrates this point. His credibility in wielding such threats allows for compliance without frequent enforcement. In asymmetrical power dynamics, like those with smaller countries, significant concessions can appear to validate bullying as a viable methodology to accomplish major goals, leading supporters to argue a deeper strategic intent at play.
However, the viability of bullying encounters inherent limitations. The bullied nations may push back, seeking to lessen their dependency through collective agreements or new alliances, thus reducing their vulnerability. For instance, European nations raising defence budgets may reflect a shift away from reliance on U.S. protection, ultimately impairing the efficacy of previous bullying tactics.
Moreover, while bullying may force compliance on singular issues, it can obstruct broader collaboration based on trust—an essential element for sustained international relations. Forcing compliance may yield immediate concessions but can erode vital partnerships critical for cooperation in sensitive areas, which are grounded in mutual trust and shared interests.
Threats, even when robust, possess a finite power, especially when employed to achieve multiple objectives simultaneously. A threat effective in one realm may not yield results in another; thus, the expectation that one traditional threat can yield compliance across various matters may vastly overestimate its impact, especially as such threats dilute their own credibility through overuse.
The indiscriminate deployment of tariffs undermines their effectiveness, particularly with larger players who can absorb such economic pressures. If the U.S. attempts enforcement in multiple domains, resources get strained, further weakening the threat’s overall power.
Extreme threats necessitate equally extreme scenarios for credibility, often leading to substantial repercussions for the bully. For instance, a threat to devastate a nation would likely invite severe backlash over any perceived advantages. Histories show even powerful nations hesitate to apply maximal sanctions against larger states, as their entangled interests often reveal significant vulnerabilities.
Ultimately, despite its allure, bullying lacks the resilience to serve as a long-term strategy for international relations. Just as in schoolyard encounters, excessive threats can lead to isolation rather than compliance, demonstrating that such tactics diminish prospects for constructive and enduring diplomatic outcomes. The lessons transcending schoolyards and marketplaces now resonate on a global stage, revealing that bullying may foster short-term compliance but jeopardises vital long-term cooperative engagements.
Sanjay G. Reddy is an associate professor of economics at the New School for Social Research in New York.
The article critiques the use of bullying, particularly through threats and tariffs by Trump, as a means of foreign policy. It argues that while immediate goals may be met, bullying undermines trust and cooperation, making it a poor long-term strategy. Countries might seek alternatives to reduce dependence, which could weaken the bully’s position. A thorough understanding of the economics behind bullying reveals its limitations in effective diplomacy.
In examining the economics of bullying as an approach to foreign policy, it becomes clear that while immediate compliance might be achievable through intimidation, the long-term implications are detrimental. Nations subjected to bullying are likely to push back, search for alternatives, or undermine the trust necessary for meaningful cooperation. Ultimately, bullying is not a sustainable diplomatic strategy, as its effectiveness wanes and countermeasures intensify.
Original Source: foreignpolicy.com
